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JOHN 0. McGINNIs**
Professor Sunstein is the foremost exponent of civic republi-
canism and The Partial Constitution' is his summa. Therefore,
the book is signally important because civic republicanism has
become a rallying cry for a platoon of leading law professors
engaged in constitutional law and indeed public law generally.2
Unfortunately, however, if Sunstein's book is fairly representa-
tive of the movement, civic republicanism is unlikely to last. His
is a constitutional jurisprudence that appears to exhaust the
entire spectrum of error-historical, scientific, and philosoph-
ical-that may derange a legal theory.
Professor Sunstein's substantive theory is that the Constitu-
tion's overarching objective is to create "a republic of reasons": a
regime where citizens will collectively deliberate on all social
practices and discard those not justified by reasons.' Like many
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law
School. B.A., Harvard College, 1975; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978.
** Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. BA., Harvard Col-
lege, 1978; M.A., Balliol College, Oxford University, 1980; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1983. My thanks to Stephen Altschul, Jonathan Bush, David Carlson, Benedict Co-
hen, Robert Delahunty, Neal Devins, Marci Hamilton, Michael Herz, David Katz,
Nelson Lund, Mark Movsesian, Michael Paulsen, Michael Rappaport, Paul Shupack,
Stewart Sterk, and Daniel Troy for helpful comments. I am also grateful to Law-
rence Altman for his research assistance and substantive comments.
1. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrrUTION (1993).
2. In the last nine years, the term "civic republican" or its cognate has been
used in 258 articles collected in LEXIS. For a discussion of the reasons that civic
republicanism is popular in the current legal academy, see infra notes 153-62 and
accompanying text.
3. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 17.
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civic republicans, his constitutional theory appears to have both
a historical component (such a deliberative regime was the ex-
plicit or implicit essence of constitutional philosophy at the
nation's founding) and a social theory component (only social
practices founded on reasons as distinguished from practices
founded simply on the interests of social groups or what
Sunstein terms "naked preferences"4 are just). Both components
are deeply and variously flawed.
The greatest virtue of The Partial Constitution is its admira-
bly simple, straightforward, and coherent structure. Sunstein
argues that the essence of the historical Constitution was to
establish a deliberative democracy in which citizens could reason
together to transform society into a more just social order.5 He
rejects the idea that the Constitution's central purpose was to
protect natural rights. Indeed, according to Sunstein, rights are
not natural but entirely products of law.' Thus, a jurisprudence
designed to protect natural rights pretends to employ neutral
principles but actually is biased by an interest in protecting the
status quo. He labels this incorrect approach to constitutional
interpretation "status quo neutrality."7
Sunstein next offers a brief history of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence in which an interpretation of the Constitution that pro-
motes a deliberative democracy of social transformation has
competed with interpretations that are biased by the objective of
protecting "status quo neutrality."8 According to Sunstein, the
latter are exemplified by such cases as Plessy v. Ferguson9 and
Lochner v. New York. ° Plessy mistakenly affirmed the domi-
nant customs of segregation as natural; Lochner mistakenly
affirmed common law property rights as the natural template of
4. Id. at 25-27.
5. Id. at 20-21.
6. Id. at 3-4. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 70-75 and ac-
companying text.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 40-68.
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1986).
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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society. Such bias has tended to make judicial interpretation of
the Constitution "partial," hence one sense of the book's title.'
Sunstein recognizes that an emphasis on the Constitution's
socially transformative potential has required revisions in the
separation of powers and federalism, because structures facili-
tating intragovernmental conflict may inhibit social change. 2
For Sunstein, however, these structural principles seem less im-
portant because the Constitution's pervasive requirement that
collective deliberation be reasoned itself operates as a substan-
tial restraint on government action motivated by improper inter-
ests. Indeed, such is his respect for the reason of the deliberative
process that he would rely more on the political branches than
the judiciary to work out the substantive principles of the consti-
tutional order.3 Hence, because of the importance of executive
and legislative interpretation, judicial interpretation of the Con-
stitution is inevitably "partial" in a second sense.'4
The remainder of the book is mostly devoted to using this gen-
eral theory to transform specific areas of constitutional law, such
as the First Amendment and abortion. 5 Sunstein's discussion
of the First Amendment is of particular importance to his gener-
al theory, because it addresses the problem of assuring the wide
dispersion of information necessary to collective decisionmak-
ing-a central issue for any theory that views deliberative de-
mocracy as the heart of the Constitution. If reason is to be the
principal check on government tyranny, it will be essential that
citizens be well informed. Therefore, it is entirely consonant
with the premises of civic republicanism for Sunstein to con-
struct his First Amendment jurisprudence with the objective of
providing the citizen with diverse and relevant public policy
information.
Unfortunately, the deliberative regime of social transforma-
tion that Sunstein discovers at the heart of the Framers' Consti-
tution is constructed from historical distortions and exaggera-
tions, suggesting that bad history is the homage Sunstein pays
11. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at v.
12. Id. 60-61.
13. Id. at 123-61.
14. Id. at vi.
15. Id. at 197-290.
1994] 1753
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1751
to originalism.'6 In particular, he is not persuasive in sug-
gesting that "republicanism" explains the fundamental commit-
ments and purposes of the Constitution better than natural
rights or pluralist political theories. The first part of this Essay
will demonstrate that, to the contrary, republican theory as
embraced by the Framers was consistent with the view embod-
ied in the Constitution that the protection of natural rights is
the primary, if not the sole, object of government and that mech-
anisms of pluralism are the best way of maximizing that protec-
tion. Indeed, the normative core of republicanism was that the
State should be ruled for the common good rather than for the
ruler's good. This republican tenet comported with the natural
rights understanding of the Constitution because the common
good was widely understood to be coterminous with the protec-
tion of natural rights.
Republicanism at the time of the Founding was a theory about
the structure of government as well as about its purpose: in Eu-
rope it had stressed that the regime must be structured to venti-
late conflicting interests such as monarchical, aristocratic, and
democratic elements of society in order to achieve lasting politi-
cal stability. When transplanted into a new world of multiple
and diffuse interests this distinctive republican sociology of re-
gimes naturally gave rise to pluralism as well as to institutional
mechanisms of internal governmental conflict such as separation
of powers and federalism. These mechanisms helped insure
against the danger that federal government would degenerate
into an engine for the destruction of the natural rights it was
established to protect. Thus, correctly understood, republican
theory at the time of the Framers does not stand in opposition to
natural rights and pluralist theories of the Constitution but
instead is a bridge connecting them.
16. Sunstein rejects originalism, despite acknowledging the importance of text and
history. Id. at 119-22. Running throughout the book is an underlying claim about
the interpretative methodology of the Constitution: we cannot understand the Consti-
tution without an interpretative theory and the interpretative theory we apply is a
matter of political choice. See id. at 101-02. Although I believe his interpretative
theory also to be in error, I do not address it in this Essay. For an attack of
Sunstein's interpretive theory, see Gregory E. Maggs, Yet Still Partial to It, 103
YALE L.J. 1627 (1994) (book review).
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Once it is clear that Sunstein's deliberative regime of social
transformation can find no refuge in the historical Constitution,
the second part of this Essay will demonstrate that his own con-
stitutional jurisprudence wholly lacks the political realism of
real republicanism. Having rejected the natural rights baseline
of the Constitution, Sunstein gives government a far larger
scope of social control while simultaneously largely rejecting the
republican mechanisms for constraining government and the
social forces poised to capture it. Therefore, he has left himself
an important question for any republican: What will restrain a
democracy with the power to reorder every practice of society?
Sunstein's notion that reason can provide this restraint faces
very substantial barriers in the nature of man and the nature of
the world.' 7 First, collective decisionmaking is unlikely to pro-
duce choices based on reasoned deliberation, because the citizens
who have the most concentrated interest in a subject matter will
have a disproportionate influence over that subject precisely
because they can gain the most from a favorable collective de-
cision. Indeed, as Sunstein's own discussion of the First Amend-
ment reveals, the ideal of republican dialogue itself is largely
unrealistic because citizens without a very substantial interest
in a subject will fail to seek information on the matter, given
17. Although Sunstein recognizes that nature may inhibit specific projects of social
reform, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 69, he never seems to realize that nature
offers substantial barriers to his entire mechanism of reform. Indeed, it is striking
that nowhere in his theory does he offer his view of human nature.
Although my concept of the nature of man will become clear as this Essay un-
folds, a brief definition can be sketched here. Man's nature has been shaped by
biology: millions of years have stamped him as a competitor for resources against
other species and his kind. See generally CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN
NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT
(1991) (discussing the growing importance of biologically based views of human na-
ture). Man's intelligence and thus his ability to reason has evolved as an instrument
for obtaining resources: for this reason the science of economics is based on premises
broadly consistent with man's biological nature. See GARY S. BECKER, Altruism, Ego-
ism and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 14 (1976)
(noting that both sociobiology and economics "rely on competition, allocation and
limited resources" as well as efficient adaptation to the environment). While altruism
is possible when there are mutual gains to be obtained from cooperation, see ROBERT
AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984), society must be built with the
recognition of the fundamentally self-interested nature of man. Human nature will
reflect itself in the public as well as the private sphere.
1994] 1755
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both the small chance that even a well-informed vote or voice
will affect the collective decision of millions of others and the
relatively small effect a collective decision will likely have on the
happiness of the citizen. Moreover, cognitive limits to collective
decisionmaking also exist: some of the intricacies of complex
collective choices are often beyond the comprehension of many
citizens because of limitations imposed by their training or abili-
ty.
Sunstein's image of collective decisionmaking resembles that
which would emerge from a continual Platonic dialogue between
relatively unselfish and very knowledgeable participants en-
gaged in a tireless search for the truth. In the real world, such
decisionmaking, when bereft of a natural rights framework and
strong internal checks and balances, is more like a drama by
Beckett where the interested dominate the ignorant for the first
act only to reverse roles in the second act, the net result being
that both groups are worse off than when the action began. To
be sure, deliberative democracy performs important but limited
functions in a modern republic: it assures that the rulers will
not be able to ignore the interests of the ruled and it promotes
political stability. The notion, however, that civil society--the
social order created by the exercise of individual rights--should
be subject to continuous reformation through reasoned political
discourse was an ideal not only rejected by the Framers, but is
ultimately unachievable in the real world, at least in a large
republic with a universal franchise."
18. Sunstein seems enamored of classical republicanism. See SUNSTEIN, supra note
1, at 21. It is true that in some classical republics the ideal was for men to realize
themselves in. the political rather than private realm. See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 147 (Rex Warner trans., Penquin Books 1972) (quoting
Pericles to the effect that a man who has no interest in politics- has no business
being a citizen of Athens). The difficulty with setting political philosophy back two
thousand years, however, is twofold. First, the republicanism of the period of the
framing of the Constitution derived from Machiavelli rather than classical theorists.
Indeed, The Federalist harshly criticizes the republics of ancient Greece:
It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and
Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions
with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of
revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration
between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.
1756
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The third section of this Essay will focus on the conceptual
problems inherent in Sunstein's project. Although Sunstein pro-
claims that requiring a decision to be justified by reasons makes
a huge difference to collective decisionmaking, he never shows
how this can be the case. Indeed, it is far from clear that
Sunstein's distinction between practices founded on reasons and
those founded on interests has any utility in separating out un-
constitutional from constitutional social practices, because inter-
ests and reasons are parallel categories available as explana-
tions for any action. 9 The reasons one person offers for his ac-
tions inevitably can be explained by others as a product of his
interests. If reason and interest can be viewed as parallel cate-
gories, a republican would suspect that the ruler, whether in the
judiciary, the legislature, or the executive, generally will deter-
mine that decisions favoring his interest or the interest of his
supporters are reasoned.
I. THE ACTUAL COMMITMENTS OF THE HISTORICAL
CONSTITUTION
Professor Sunstein invokes the historical Constitution to sup-
port his notion that the essential purpose of a democratic repub-
lic is to empower a government to reform or even transform
society through collective reasoning."° To that end, Sunstein
THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Second, modem social science, using analytical tools and empirical evidence not
available to the ancients, casts doubt on the efficacy and coherence of collective
decisionmaking. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 406 (1989) (discuss-
ing modem theorems that "raise fundamental questions about the possibility of es-
tablishing collective choice procedures satisfying minimally appealing normative prop-
erties"). See also infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
19. Of course, the Constitution does expressly preclude some social practices that
certain interests may favor, but Sunstein offers no new mechanism except an appeal
to reason to discover which practices or which interests these are.
20. While Sunstein disclaims any adherence to originalism, see supra note 16, it is
in his interest to suggest that his theory is compatible with the Framers' essential
thinking. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. He has attempted to root
previous interpretations of the Constitution in historical understanding with similar
success. Compare David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitu-
tion, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992) with John 0.
McGinnis, The President, the Constitution and the Confirmation Process, 71 TEK L.
REV. 633 (1993).
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argues that the Constitution's core commitment was to "delib-
erative democracy."2 He contends that the Constitution was
not "designed only to protect a set of identified 'private
rights'... [or] to provide rules for interest-group struggles
among selfish private groups." " To the contrary, according to
Sunstein, the legacy of the American Revolution was a rebellion
against the "the natural order of things"-a celebration of the
notion that the political order is man-made and thus subject to
continual revisions according to reason.13 For Sunstein, the on-
going potential for social transformation is the essence of the re-
publican thinking that animates the Constitution.
A. Natural Rights and Property Rights
This Section will explain why theories of natural rights, plu-
ralism, and republicanism that Sunstein contrasts were not in
fundamental tension at the framing of the Constitution, but, to
the contrary, formed a fairly coherent whole in the political phi-
losophy of the day. A discussion of natural rights is the proper
starting point, because despite Sunstein's claims, overwhelming
evidence demonstrates that both the proponents and opponents
of the Constitution agreed that the protection of natural rights
was the central purpose and limit of government. Indeed, many
Framers, including Madison (whom Sunstein appears to regard
as the patron saint of civic republicanism), agreed on the even
narrower proposition that the primary object of government was
the protection of property, although most Framers' understand-
ing of property was more capacious than Sunstein's.24 In the
21. SUNSTEIN, supra, note 1, at 19-20; see also id. at 60 (discussing "original com-
mitment to deliberative democracy").
22. Id. at 21. Of course, to demonstrate that the Constitution's core commitment
is to deliberative democracy, it is not enough to show that the document was not
designed only to protect natural rights or sustain a pluralistic society. Sunstein,
however, does not even succeed in showing that deliberative democracy was other
than an instrument for the protection of natural rights.
23. Id. at 19. One difficulty with Sunstein's reliance on the American Revolution
as a key to a proper understanding of the Constitution is that the Constitution
emerged not directly from the Revolutionary period but from the critical period dur-
ing which renewed consideration was given to the importance of natural rights, par-
ticularly those of property. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
24. The importance of property rights to the Constitution has been recently recov-
1758
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Federalist Papers, Madison states baldly that "[t]he protection of
these faculties [the different and unequal faculties for acquiring
property] is the first object of government."25 Gouverneur Mor-
ris, the Framer who, after Madison, spoke most often at the
Convention, also held the view that property "was the main ob-
ject of society.""
ered by Jennifer Nedelsky. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). I am pleased to acknowledge the
usefulness of her work in preparing this Essay. Nevertheless, as will become clear
from my discussion, I have three reservations about Professor Nedelsky's treatment.
First, she does not sufficiently emphasize that to many of the Framers, rights that
we today understand as civil rights such as free speech were not different in kind
from property rights. Second, although in some moods Madison may have had Mal-
thusian tendencies, generally the view of the Framers was that the exercise of rights
would lead to greater prosperity for all. Finally, respect for property rights and the
spirit of commerce to which they were allied was not confined to the Federalists; it
was so widely shared by Federalists and Antifederalists alike that it must be consid-
ered part of the common political grammar of America at the time of the Founding.
25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). It
is striking, to say the least, that Sunstein relies on Federalist No. 10 to argue that
the Constitution's core commitment is to deliberative democracy, but falls to ac-
knowledge that within Federalist No. 10 Madison views the protection of property
rights as the essential objective of government and structures democratic represen-
tation to better meet that objective.
26. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 533 (Max Farrand
ed., 2d ed. 1937). Gouverneur Morris also stated that the state of nature "was only
renounced for the sake of property which could only be secured by the restraints of
regular Government." Id. At the Convention, Mr. Rutledge agreed with Gouverneur
Morris that "[piroperty was certainly the principal object of Society." Id. at 534; see
also Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1015 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,8 57 )
(Patterson, J.) ("The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social
compact . . . ."); Letter from the House of Representatives of Massachusetts to
Dennys de Berdt (Jan. 12, 1768), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS
134, 138 (Harry A. Cushing ed., 1904) ("The security of right and property, is the
great end of government. Surely, then, such measures as tend to render right and
property precarious, tend to destroy both property and government; for these must
stand and fall together.").
The idea that protection of property is the motivating force of men entering into
society dates back at least to Locke: "The great and chief end therefore, of Mens
uniting into Commonwealths, and putting themselves under Government is the Pres-
ervation of their Property." JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368-69
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690). Locke's use of the word
"property," was meant to convey more than just ownership of realty or chattel; he
wrote that he called "Lives, Liberty and Estates . . . by the general Name, Proper-
ty." Id. at 368; see also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
670 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library 1937) (1776) ("The acquisition of valuable
and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment of civil gov-
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At times Sunstein concedes that certain provisions of the Con-
stitution, such as the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, suggest that certain property rights
were a baseline not to be disturbed." Nevertheless, he fails to
recognize the pervasiveness of rights in general, and property
rights in particular, in the Framers' justification of the Constitu-
tion. Madison, for instance, did not view freedom of speech as
merely an instrument of democratic deliberation, but essentially
as a species of property right." In defending freedom of speech,
Madison stated that man "has a property in his opinions and the
free communication of them;"29 in defending free exercise of re-
ligion he declares that man "has a property... in his religious
opinions;" " and more generally that man "has an equal proper-
ty in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on
which to employ them.""' For Madison, "[glovernment is insti-
tuted to protect property of every sort," including the speech
production rights protected by the First Amendment. 2
Madison's emphasis on property rights is hard to square with a
government of social transformation empowered to redistribute
property according to the reasons of the day. There is no evi-
dence that Madison or other Framers sought to protect property
from depredations of those with less facility for acquiring it so
that it could be then parcelled out by the politicians of a deliber-
ative democracy.
Moreover, the rights to be protected by the government were
generally understood as natural, not simply as social conven-
tions.3 The exercise of these rights, in turn, was understood to
ernment. Where there is no property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two
or three days labour, civil government is not so necessary.").
27. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 91-92.
28. See James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
Madison's view of the nature of the First Amendment suggests that it is not
"strange," as Sunstein asserts, SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 199, for the First Amend-
ment vigorously to protect commercial speech as well as political speech. Commercial
speech is no less one's property than political speech.
29. James Madison, Property, NATL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE




33. Many of the state constitutions from the time of the Revolution expressly ac-
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create civil society. Property rights to material goods create
prosperity and indeed are what has enabled society to progress
to civilization.' Property rights in opinions (called the freedom
of speech) lead to the discovery of truth, as false ideas are refut-
ed and replaced.35 Property rights in conscience (called the free
exercise of religion) lead to enlightened morals and beliefs. 6
knowledge that property rights are natural and inalienable. See, e.g., MASS. CONST.
OF 1780 art. I, reprinted in 3 FRANcIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITO-
RIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1888, 1889 (1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] ("All men
are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights,
among which may be reckoned the right ... of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property ... ."); PA. CONST. OF 1776 art. I, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3081, 3082 ("That all men are born equally free and inde-
pendent, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which
are acquiring, possessing and protecting property . .. ."); see also James Madison,
Property, NAT'L GAZETrE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 28, at 266 ("In its larger and juster meaning, [property] em-
braces every thing to which man may attach a value and have a right; and which
leaves every one else the like advantage.").
34. See, e.g., James Madison, Note to His Speech on the Right of Suffrage, Docu-
mentary History 5:440-49 ("In civilized communities, property ... is an essential
object of the laws, which encourage[s] industry by securing the enjoyment of its
fruits."); Gouverneur Morris, Political Enquiries 1776: An Essay by Gouverneur Mor-
ris, reprinted in Willi P. Adams, "The Spirit of Commerce Requires That Property Be
Sacred": Gouverneur Morris and the American Revolution, 21 AMERIKASTUDIEN 327,
331 (1976). ("The most rapid advances in the State of Society are produced by Com-
merce . . . . [Commerce] requires not only the perfect Security of Property but per-
fect good faith .... It requires also that every Citizen have the Right freely to use
his Property.").
35. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO THE PEO-
PLE OF THE COmMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (1799), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 332, 337 (Gillard Hunt ed., 1906) ("By subjecting the truth of opin-
ion to the regulation, fine, and imprisonment, to be inflicted by those who are of a
different opinion, the free range of the human mind is injuriously restrained.");
JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE RESOLUTIONS (1799-1800), reprinted in 6 THE WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 341, 389 ("[To the press alone, chequered as it
is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained
by reason and humanity over error and oppression .... ").
36. Thomas Jefferson believed that the free exercise of religion led to truth.
Reason and free enquiry are the only effectual agents against error. Give
a loose to them, they will support the true religion, by bringing every
false one to their tribunal, to the test of their investigation. They are the
natural enemies of error and of error only. Had not the Roman govern-
ment permitted free enquiry, Christianity could never been introduced.
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Thus the beneficial social fabric of prosperity, truth, and mor-
als-the common good of civil society-is the consequence of an
order created by prepolitical rights and not the result of collec-
tive deliberations. Accordingly, the Framers' general under-
standing is in sharp contrast to that of Sunstein, who collapses
civil society into political society and the natural social order
created through the exercise of natural rights into one created
by government."
To be sure, the Framers understood that government was
necessary to give greater security to the fruits obtained by the
exercise of rights. The social contract establishing government
was struck for the purpose of providing that security.38 Thus,
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 157-61 (William Peden ed.,
1955) (1787).
St. George Tucker warned against allowing the balance to tip in favor of reli-
gious establishments.
But what I wish most to urge is the tendency of religious establishments
to impede the improvement of the world. They are boundaries prescribed
by human folly to human investigation; and enclosures, which intercept
the light, and confine the exertions of reason. Let any one imagine to
himself what effects similar establishments would have in philosophy,
navigation, metaphysics, medicine, or mathematics.
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES app. at 8 (Augustus M. Kelley
ed., 1969) (1803).
Madison wrote against the adoption of a bill to provide for Christian teachers:
"Instead of Levelling as far as possible, every obstacle to the victorious progress of
Truth, the Bill [establishing in Virginia a provision for Christian teachers] with an
ignoble and unchristian timidity would circumscribe it with a wall of defence against
the encroachments of error." James Madison, To the Honorable the General Assem-
bly of the Commonwealth of Virginia, A Memorial and Remonstrance (ca. June 20,
1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 303 (Robert A. Rutland &
William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
37. For discussion of Sunstein's arguments for conflating natural order and the
order created by government, see infra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; see also Civics [David Ramsay],
Letter to the Columbian Herald (Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 4, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 147, 147-48 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) ("These relin-
quishments of natural rights, are not real sacrifices: each person, county or state,
gains more than it loses, for it only gives up a right of injuring others, and obtains
in return aid and strength to secure itself in the peaceable enjoyment of all re-
maining rights."); James Wilson, Opening Address of the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, su-
pra, at 791, 797 ("On the other hand, in entering into the social compact, though
the individual parts with a portion of his natural rights, yet it is evident that he
gains more by the limitation of his own,-so that in truth, the aggregate of liberty
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the central issue for the science of government was how to cre-
ate a governmental structure that would simultaneously facili-
tate the enforcement of these natural rights and yet be re-
strained from becoming the very instrument of their impair-
ment. As we shall see, aspects of republican theory played an
important role at the Founding precisely because they suggested
ways of protecting natural rights from the dangers posed by gov-
ernment.
The views of the Antifederalists in fact demonstrate the ex-
tent of the consensus on the primacy of natural rights at the
time of the Founding. They agreed in great measure with the
Framers' views on the purpose and limit of government, while
bitterly disputing the idea that the Constitution realized those
purposes and limits.3 9 For instance, the Antifederalists were
generally even more emphatic than the Federalists that people
had natural rights, including property rights, the freedom of
speech, and the right of religious conscience.4" Like the Federal-
is more in society, than it is in a state of nature."). The importance of social con-
tract theory dates back to Locke and Blackstone.
For the principal aim of Society is to protect individuals in the enjoy-
ment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immu-
table laws of nature.. . . Hence it follows, that the first and primary
end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of
individuals.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 124 (9th ed.,
Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978).
For the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that
for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires,
that the People should have Property, without which they must be
suppos'd to lose that by entering into Society, which was the end for
which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own.
See LOCKE, supra note 26, at 378.
39. 1 THE COMPLETE ANn-FEDERALIST 53 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("The
Federalists and Antifederalists agreed that government is properly directed to the
pursuit of limited ends, namely the security of individual rights; and there was very
limited debate about limited government in this fundamental sense . .,. ."); see also
Agrippa [James Winthrop], Letter to the Massachusetts Gazette (Jan. 11, 15, 18,
1788), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, at 762, 762
("It is universally agreed, that the object of every just government is to render the
people happy, by securing their persons and possessions from wrong.").
40. See, e.g., Brutus, N.Y.J., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in, 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 39, at 408.
The design of civil government is to protect the rights and promote
the happiness of the people.
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ists, they believed that the exercise of these rights created a
social tapestry of prosperity and enlightenment and many were
even more optimistic than the Federalists that the spirit of com-
merce would unite those engaged in business.4' They also gen-
erally agreed that the purpose of government was to provide
greater security for these rights. In their view, the social com-
pact was justified in curtailing rights only insofar as it provided
greater security for the rights that remained.42 Indeed, one
For this end, rulers are invested with powers. But we cannot from
hence justly infer that these powers should be unlimited. There are cer-
tain rights which mankind possess, over which government ought not to
have any control, because it is not necessary they should, in order to
attain the end of its institution.
Id.; see also The Federal Farmer, Letter to the Editor, COUNTRY J. (Poughkeepsie,
N.Y.), Oct. 9, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 39,
at 231 ("There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming the
social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed-a free and enlightened
people, in forming this compact, will not resign all their rights to those who govern,
and they will fix limits to their legislators and rulers . . ").
41. See, e.g., John DeWitt, To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, AM. HERALD (Boston), ca. Dec. 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 39, at 34, 35.
The chief blessings of society, like individuals, are fond of association,
and have a mutual dependence upon each other. They form links of one
chain, and are all actuated by the same cause. Where freedom prevails,
industry and science there also prevail. Industry produces wealth, and
science preserves freedom in purity.
Id.; Agrippa, To the People, MASS. GAZETTE, Nov. 23, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 39, at 71.
[Tihe spirit of commerce is the great bond of union among citizens. This
furnishes employment for their activity, supplies their mutual wants, de-
fends the rights of property, and producing reciprocal dependencies, ren-
ders the whole system harmonious and energetic. Our great object there-
fore ought to be to encourage this spirit. If we examine the present state
of the world we shall find that most of the business is done in the freest
states, and that industry decreases in proportion to the rigor of govern-
ment.
Id.
42. See, e.g., Cato, The Citizens of the State of New-York, N.Y.J., reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 39, at 110 ("[Tihe great question then,
that arises on this new political principle, is, whether it will answer the ends for
which it is said to be offered to you, and for which all men engage in political soci-
ety, to wit, the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates.");
Philadelphiensis, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Philadelphia), reprinted in 3 THE COi-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 39, at 110.
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Antifederalist offered a principle that may represent the best
summary of the philosophical consensus of the time on the jus-
tice of governmental structures: "They ought to construct [gov-
ernment] in such a manner as to procure the best possible secu-
rity for their rights;-in doing this they ought to give up no
greater share than what is understood to be absolutely neces-
sary . ..."" The Antifederalists thus agreed that the essential
purpose of government was to conserve natural (i.e., prepolitical)
rights. The common grammar of government at the time of the
Framers was essentially the opposite of Sunstein's notion of a
government empowered to transform civil society."
Finally, the text of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
themselves explicitly evidence the natural rights foundation of
the Framers' thought. Within the original unamended document,
the Contracts Clause 5 is the most direct marker of the natural
rights conception: State governments, whether representative or
not, are disabled from interfering with contracts.46 Thus, the
Contracts Clause also presupposes a view that contractual rights
are part of a preexisting civil fabric that government is obliged
to protect rather than disturb. Although Sunstein acknowledges
The only thing in which a government should be efficient, is to protect
the liberties, lives, and property of the people governed, from foreign and
domestic violence. This, and this only is, what every government should
do effectually. For any government to do more than this, is impossible,
and every one that falls short of it is defective.
Id.
43. To the Free People of Virginia, VA. INDEPENDENT CHRON., Feb. 20, 1788, re-
printed in 5 THE COiPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 39, at 176; see also Wil-
liam Penn, To the Citizens of the United States, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER
(Philadelphia), Jan. 2, 1788, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 39, at 170 ("T]he best government is that which secures to the citizens the
greatest share of their natural rights .... ").
44. Yet another demonstration that many of the Federalists wanted no part of
deliberative democracy of social transformation was their hostility to the theories of
Jean Jacques Rousseau. See PAUL M. SPURLIN, ROUSSEAU IN AMERIcA 1760-1809, at
44, 61 (1969) (quoting John Adams as stating that Rousseau's ideas on property
were full of "wild ravings" and Noah Webster as stating that Rousseau's ideas were
"chimerical" and not founded in "experience").
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (-No State shall.., pass any Law impairing
the Obligation on Contracts . . .).
46. Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the
Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 528-29 (1987).
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that the Fifth Amendment contains such a natural rights mark-
er in its prohibition on the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation,47 such markers in the Bill of
Rights as a whole, however, are pervasive.48 While it may be
possible to conceive of freedom of speech as being protected be-
cause it was instrumental to deliberative democracy rather than
as a natural right, we have already seen that this was not the
understanding of Madison and the predominant political phi-
losophy of the time.49 In any event, the religious freedom en-
shrined in the Free Exercise Clause' cannot easily be under-
stood as merely instrumental to deliberation, but was instead
protected because it was a natural right.5
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment by asserting "[tihe right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects,"" also indicates that there is a rights baseline for civil
society." The criminal law enforcement authority of the govern-
ment poses in concrete form the general dilemma of assuring
that government increase rather than decrease the security of
rights. Properly used, the criminal law enforcement authority
can facilitate the exercise of private rights; arbitrarily used, it
can threaten the private sphere that is the wellspring of civil
society. Therefore, the reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment attempts to maximize the security of rights by min-
imizing the sum of private and governmental deprivations of lib-
erty and property.54 The Fourth Amendment thus neatly encap-
47. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 128.
48. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text for examples.
49. See supra text accompanying note 29.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. As was discussed earlier, free exercise was understood by the Founders as a
natural right. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
53. See, e.g, The Federal Farmer, Letter to the Editor, COUNTRY J. (Poughkeepsie,
N.Y.), Oct. 12, 1787 (letter to the editor), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDER-
ALIST, supra note 39, at 249. ("There are other essential rights, which we have just-
ly understood to be the rights of freemen; as freedom from hasty and unreasonable
search warrants, warrants not founded on oath, and not issued with due caution, for
searching and seizing men's papers, property, and persons.").
54. See Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 793 (1994) ("In assessing the 'reasonableness' of any Fourth Amendment intru-
sion, we should consider whether an incremental government intrusion will be more
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sulates the underlying political philosophy of the Constitution as
a whole.
While Sunstein never directly confronts evidence that the ob-
jective of the Constitution was to protect the exercise of natural
rights, he does attempt to discredit the centrality of the natural
rights with a variety of less direct arguments. First, he suggests
that the Framers' revolutionary dissatisfaction with the status
quo suggests a general rejection of any natural order, presum-
ably including the civil order immanent in the exercise of natu-
ral rights.55 In the late eighteenth century there was, however,
no inconsistency in being simultaneously a revolutionary and a
believer in natural rights. In his discussion of the rights of prop-
erty cited above, Madison is also eloquent about the injustice of
current laws-the status quo-
where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies
deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and
free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute
their property in the general sense of the word; but are the
means of acquiring property strictly so called. What must be
the spirit of legislation where a manufacturer of linen cloth is
forbidden to bury his own child in a linen shroud, in order to
favour his neighbour who manufactures woolen cloth; where
the manufacturer and wearer of woolen cloth are again for-
bidden the economical use of buttons of that material, in
favor of the manufacturer of buttons of other materials! 6
than offset by a likely diminution of private violence.")
Of course, this discussion does not exhaust the list of natural right markers in
the historical Constitution. Professors Lawson and Granger have recently suggested
that the word "proper" in the Necessary and Proper Clause requires that all executo-
ry legislation "conform to the traditional principles of individual rights." See Gary
Larson & Patricia B. Granger, The 'Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 329 (1993). In any event,
the Ninth Amendment speaks of rights "retained by the people," even if these rights
are defined residually from the powers delegated to the federal government. See
Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 1215, 1221 (1990).
55. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 19.
56. James Madison, Property, THE NAV'L GAZETrE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 28, at 266, 267.
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Madison's conception of rights was egalitarian and revolutionary
in this limited sense: each person had God-given natural rights
to exercise. The regime, therefore, was unjust insofar as it re-
stricted those rights by giving special status to aristocrats or
monopolists." Thus, Madison's dissatisfaction with a status quo
that rested on such artificial restrictions actually flowed from
his embrace of natural rights as the baseline for assessing the
justice and proper functioning of government."
Second, Sunstein argues that Madison's philosophy was egali-
tarian in another sense, suggesting that it would justify an
individual's constitutional right to basic services to be funded by
taxing the resources of others.59 Sunstein relies principally on a
quotation from Madison, written in the same year as his disqui-
sition on property discussed above. Madison wished to combat
parties and factions:
1. By establishing a political equality among all. 2. By with-
holding unnecessary opportunities from a few, to increase the
inequality of property, by an immoderate, and especially an
unmerited, accumulation of riches. 3. By the silent operation
of laws, which, without violating the rights of property, re-
duce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise
extreme indigence towards a state of comfort. 0
57. In colonial times, aristocrats and monopolists were frequently one and the
same as a result of the royal power to grant monopolies. For a discussion of the
colonists' anger against royal attempts at creating artificial class distinctions, see
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 83-90
(1969).
58. Sunstein's attempt to discredit the view that the Constitution presupposes a
natural baseline by suggesting that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), rested
on such a baseline, derives from his conflation of natural rights and social norms.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 42-45. It may be true that the majority in Plessy relied
on social norms that relegated blacks to an inferior social position, but such reliance
would be wholly unjustified on a natural rights baseline. Because the natural rights
baseline implied a hostility to social regulation that served to deprive citizens of the
equal exercise of their rights, a natural rights baseline would be incompatible with
government enforced segregation.
59. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 138. The constitutional principle Sunstein believes
that Madison shares is "a belief in freedom from desperate conditions. No one should
be deprived of adequate police protection, food, shelter or medical care." Id.
Sunstein's use of the word "deprive" glosses over a central question of political phi-
losophy: Is someone deprived of medical care simply because no one is willing to
provide it to him on terms he would like?
60. James Madison, Parties, NATL GAZETrE, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
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The first sentence suggests only that Madison believes in politi-
cal equality. The second sentence simply reiterates Madison's
opposition to artificial distinctions such as grants of monopoly
which give unmerited wealth. In the third sentence, by his allu-
sion to the silent operation of laws, Madison is referring to taxa-
tion of large estates, as Sunstein himself understands."' This
passage thus does not evidence Madison's embrace of positive
constitutional rights to other citizens' resources but instead
merely shows his interest in avoiding, as he had said in his
earlier discussion on property, the "excessive taxes [that] grind
the faces of the poor."62 Indeed, Madison contrasts two kinds of
"spur[s] to labor": excessive taxation of the poor and "keenness
and competitions of want."63 The former he condemns and the
latter he at least tolerates. These are hardly the words of a man
who believes that the Constitution gives citizens positive claims
to the resources produced in society.
Moreover, Madison here discusses taxation in the context of
reducing factionalism which he had previously identified in
Federalist No. 10 as the major threat to property rights. Thus,
the third sentence in Madison's quotation is best read as justify-
ing taxation insofar as it generally will strengthen the security
of natural rights by reducing faction. Taxation of great concen-
trations of wealth can be tactically justified as a means of pro-
viding the maximum security of rights in a world where perfect
security is not possible."
Third, as another counter to the natural rights baseline,
Sunstein argues that the Framers' emphasis on creating repre-
sentative institutions like the electoral college and legislatures
that were independent of direct instruction by the people show
MADISON, supra note 28, at 197-98.
61. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 138-39 (discussing Jefferson's and Madison's
view that tax exemption. for the poor would mitigate the inequality of property).
Sunstein notes that Jefferson had written to Madison about taxation in terms of the
"silent operation of the laws." Id
62. James Madison, Property, NATVL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON supra note 28, at 266, 267.
63. Id.
64. For a discussion of the Framers' pessimism about perfecting the security of
rights, see infra text accompanying notes 99-104.
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that deliberative democracy, rather than the protection of natu-
ral rights or the ventilation of interests, is at the heart of the
Constitution. He argues that individual rights were protected
because they promote deliberative democracy, not because they
are natural. Indeed, Sunstein states that "[dieliberative govern-
ment and limited government were.., one and the same."65
As we have already seen, both the major proponents and op-
ponents of the Constitution overwhelmingly believed that the
primary objective of government structures was to protect natu-
ral rights:" Sunstein provides little or no evidence that individ-
ual rights were seen merely as a means to promoting the de-
liberative democracy as the ultimate social end. Once it is con-
ceded that the Constitution was designed to protect natural
rights, its attempt to facilitate deliberation as much as possible
is readily understandable. Insofar as government institutions
can deliberate free from the hurly-burly of short-term political
pressures they are more likely to perceive clearly the civil soci-
ety created by the exercise of natural rights that government is
established to secure. Nevertheless, even the mechanisms of
government deliberation to which Sunstein points reiterate the
Framers' recognition that interest, both personal and institution-
al, rather than disinterested deliberation, are likely to dominate
daily politics. 67 The electoral college was preferred as a method
of selection of the President to selection by the legislature, be-
cause of the Framers' understanding of the danger that the
legislature would be racked by faction and cabal.68 One of the
central purposes of bicameralism, like the separation of powers
65. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 23.
66. See supra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
67. The mechanisms demonstrate the centrality of the civil society to the Framers'
designs. For instance, the electoral college was designed in part to filter out local
politicians in favor of "continental" characters-men who had gained reputation in
civil society. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26,
at 29 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris). For a discussion of the theory behind the
electoral structures of the Constitution, see David J. Katz, Grand Jury Charges
Delivered by Supreme Court Justices Riding Circuit During the 1790s, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1045, 1064 (1993).
68. JOSEPH STORY, COIMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 744, at 531 (photo. reprint, Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (stating that one
objective of the electoral college was intended to "lessen the dangers of cabal, in-
trigue, and corruption" to which the Congress could otherwise gravitate).
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generally, was to make use of the natural rivalry of institutions
so that one house would check the other.69 Thus, while
Sunstein is correct that the Framers thought highly of delibera-
tion, he fails to show that they thought that deliberation was ei-
ther the object of just government or the principal guarantor of
good government.
Fourth, Sunstein suggests that the Framers' attachment to
natural rights was simply a conceptual mistake, because the
rights depend on the government for enforcement.70 Of course,
even if Sunstein were correct that the Framers were conceptual-
ly mistaken, he would not have shown that this mistake does
not animate the actual Constitution. In any event, it is Sunstein
rather than the Framers who is confused. Sunstein's blithe as-
sertion that "[e]conomic value does not predate law; it is created
by law"7' is in large measure false. Whatever the realists may
have thought, more recent social science demonstrates that men
naturally create nongovernmental and decentralized mecha-
nisms for enforcement and so sustain valuable exchanges even
without formal rules backed by the State. For instance, within
the system of positive contractual law, market forces themselves
play an important role in assuring contract performance.72
Moreover, even when the State refuses to enforce property rights
or encumbers such enforcement with burdensome regulations,
informal mechanisms of social order spring up to serve the need
for protecting exchange value. This is the conclusion, for in-
69. See 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 415 (Robert G.
McCloskey ed., 1967) (arguing that "mutual watchfulness and mutual control be-
tween the two houses, will redound to the honour of each, and to the security and
advantage of the state").
70. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 52 (setting forth Robert Hale's view that legal
rights embody government intrusion in the economy).
71. Id. at 51. Sunstein also declares that "[m]arkets are made possible only by
government regulation, in the form of the law of tort, contract and property." Id. at
5.
72. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (examining the value
of repeat sales to consumers as a means of enforcing private contracts); Stewart
MaCaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963) (discussing the informal ways with which businessmen facilitate con-
tractual compliance).
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stance, of De Soto's recent work on the informal economies of
Latin America. 7
If the value created by individuals can be separated conceptu-
ally and factually from the action of the State, natural rights
theory remains coherent in the face of Sunstein's attack, because
natural rights theory, at least in the Framers' hands, was a nor-
mative claim about who had the right to economic values creat-
ed. Of course, the Framers understood that government action
may be essential to securing rights. Indeed, providing greater
security for property was a central, if not the central, purpose of
government.74  Nevertheless, for the Framers, only natural
rights provide a measuring rod for determining the justice of
state intervention; just government better protects what could
be produced in the absence of government.75 Sunstein does not
provide a refutation of the natural rights justification for the
State. Indeed, Sunstein notably fails to ground his theory of the
Constitution in a justification for government at all. If he were
to offer his own and different justification for the State, he
would only succeed in showing how distinct his political philoso-
phy is from that of the Framers.
Moreover, modern social science's confirmation that value as a
matter of fact can be created by informal social order vindicates
the notion of a civil order conceptually distinct from politics. It
also shows that a government that ignores the interests of man-
73. See HERANANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (June Abbott trans., 1989); see
also Marci A. Hamilton, The Moment of Constitutional Opportunity, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 937, 939 (1993) (criticizing Sunstein's proposals for substantive constitutional
provisions in emerging Eastern European democracies for their failure to reflect De
Soto's insights); Arthur J. Jacobson, Law's Other Path, 103 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
1994). For a discussion of economic order in the absence of law, see generally JACK
HIRSHLIEFER, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR IN ADVERSrrY (1987). Hirshliefer observes that
[i]nteraction via market exchange under the rules of the game ...
called political economy is only a part, often a small part, of the econom-
ic picture. Not only plants and animals, but human beings as well, inter-
act economically to a very large degree under natural economy rather
than political economy, without benefit of law or property or contract.
Id. at 191.
74. See supra notes 24-44 and accompanying text.
75. For instance, Madison criticized artificial status distinctions such as monopolies
on natural rights grounds that such monopolies prevented citizens from exercising




kind in property and exchange does so at its own peril. In fact,
the lesson of much of this century is that no matter how strong
is the concrete laid down against beneficial economic activity,
sooner or later the wild grass of an informal order of property
will break through. As shown below, because real republican
theory intensely concerned itself with the stability of the repub-
lic, humanity's immutable and powerful impulse to create prop-
erty offers yet another reason for protecting property rights in a
republic.
B. Republicanism and the Constitution
Sunstein's invocation of republicanism does little to discredit
the natural rights baseline of the Constitution, because the core
of republicanism at the time of the Framing was simply that a
republic should be designed for the good of the public rather
than for the good of the ruler. As no less a republican than
Thomas Paine stated, "[tihe word republic... means the public
good, or the good of the whole, in contradistinction to the des-
potic form, which makes the good of the sovereign, or of one
man, the only object of the government." 6 Thus, insofar as
those of the founding generation identified the common good
with the protection of natural rights, there was little tension
between republican and natural rights political theories.77 In-
deed, this conception of natural rights as the public good can be
understood as the logical fulfillment of republicanism because it
enshrines in the justification for government itself the require-
ment that government serves merely as the instrument for pro-
tecting the rights that inhere in each citizen. The just ruler
cannot rule in his own interest or the interest of the few because
76. WOOD, supra note 57, at 55-56 (quoting Thomas Paine). As Gordon Wood sug-
gests, the notion of republicanism was consistent in whig political philosophy with
the notion of limited government. See id.
77. See, e.g., Brutus, To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y.J., Nov. 1,
1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 39, at 372, 373
("To surrender [natural rights] would counteract the very end of government, to wit,
the common good."). For a discussion of the manner in which both the Federalists
and the Antifederalists viewed the exercise of natural rights as creating the common
good, see supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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the just government's sole objective is to protect the rights that
inhere equally in all.7"
The identification of the public good with the protection of
natural rights, particularly property rights, was reemphasized
during the period after the Revolution and before the framing of
the Constitution, when attacks on property rights by debtors
and others demonstrated that overthrowing the crown was not
enough to ensure that government would be guided by correct
political ideals. Indeed, James Madison believed that such at-
tacks were a principal motivation for the Constitutional Conven-
tion, arguing that it was "the necessity, of providing more effec-
tually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensa-
tion of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had
more perhaps than any thing else, produced this convention."79
In trying to correct these evils, Madison understood himself to
be saving the republican form of government by designing a
government that would better secure rights not only from the
defalcations and oppression of those who were formally invested
with office but of the factions who supported the office hold-
ers.80
Indeed, republicanism at the time of the Founding was not
only consonant with natural rights but it also holds the key to
understanding why the Framers believed that a measure of plu-
ralism was necessary to secure these rights. A common tenet of
the science of government in republican thought was that tyran-
nical governments were inherently unstable because of their
tendency to provoke revolution and dissolve into governments of
78. Another way of understanding this point is to view natural rights as a culmi-
nation of Machiavellian republicanism. Machiavelli saw that a constitutional struc-
ture that provided governing opportunities for competing princes would likely serve
those governed better than a structure dominated by a single hierarchical institution
like the Church. A society founded on natural rights restrained the rulers to an
even greater extent by further decentralizing power through the creation of a market
system: every man is a potential prince.
79. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 134.
Nedelsky provides an excellent discussion of this point. See NEDELSKY, supra note
24, at 23-24.
80. Madison feared that the republican form of government would disintegrate if
such attacks on property were allowed to continue. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 26, at 134.
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extreme democratic tendencies."' Modern republican theory,
such as Machiavelli's, asserted that without a mixture the gov-
ernment of a single principle would repress the forces of other
principles until its repression led to revolution and the institu-
tion of a government of an opposing principle." Then the cycle
of repression and revolution would begin again." The way to
prevent this perpetual cycle of construction and destruction was
to internalize the conflict of the republic's principal ele-
ments-such as the monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic
elements-in the institutions of the government.' Conflict of a
quotidian and controlled variety would serve a cathartic func-
tion, releasing tensions that otherwise would accumulate and
destroy the republic.85 The conflict would force the contending
parties to renew consideration of the republic's original prin-
ciples, which however good and noble at the republic's founding
are liable to corruption over time.8
This view was supported not only by theory but by the
Framers' experience: the American Revolution itself appeared a
consequence of the corruption and tyranny of the Parliament
and the resulting alienation of those ruled by Parliament. It
was natural, therefore, that the Framers should give consider-
ation to adapting the ideas of dynamic republican theorists who
saw that the stability of the Republic could best be preserved by
perpetual conflict between its internal governing elements.88 At
81. WOOD, supra note 57, at 19.
82. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES bk. 1, ch. 3, at 104-11 (Bernard R.
Crick ed., 1970).
83. Id.
84. Machiavelli's republicanism was concerned with "the institutional structuring,
the channeling and balancing, of this unleashed and selfish competition. In a healthy
society, unquenchable strife-between rich and poor, priests and warriors, diverse
great families and individuals-maintains a veritable dynamo of acquisitive growth."
THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLCANISM 63 (1988).
85. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 82, bk. 1, ch. 4, at 113 ("That Discord between the
Plebs and the Senate of Rome made this Republic both Free and Powerful.").
86. Id. bk. 3, ch. 1, at 386-87. Thus, pluralist institutions through the creation of
internal conflict may actually promote consideration of a republic's distinctive virtues.
87. J.GA POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 508 (1975).
88. For a discussion of Machiavelli's pervasive influence on subsequent republican
theorists, see PANGLE, supra note 84, at 52-54, 62-67. Hamilton, the author of the
Federalist numbers outlining the utility of competition between the federal govern-
ment and its state counterparts, like Machiavelli, understood "love of fame" as the
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the founding of the American Republic, the concern over contain-
ing conflict among fixed and rigid social elements was not as
acute as in Machiavelli's time. 9 Nevertheless, managing the
more diffuse interests of the republic's citizens was seen as es-
sentially the same problem as assuring political stability."
"ruling passion of the Noblest Minds." THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 437 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Because of his understanding of the passions
of rulers, Hamilton naturally was concerned to establish institutions that would
channel these passions into a healthy competition for the public interest. See
PANGLE, supra note 84, at 110 (suggesting that Hamilton aimed to protect against
rulers' passions through the institutional system itself, rather than through the mor-
al quality of its leaders); see also GERALD STOURzH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE
IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT (1970) (arguing that Hamilton's favorable view of
politicians' aspirations to greediness set him apart from his colleagues).
89. WOOD, supra note 57, at 604 (stating that Americans had "divest[ed] the vari-
ous parts of the government of their social constituents," such as aristocracy and
monarchy). Moreover, the British constitutional system predicated on a mixed gov-
ernment of social classes had failed the colonists and fallen into disrepute. Madison
bitterly objected to creating "artificial distinctions, by establishing kings, and nobles,
and plebeians" in order to create checks and balances. See James Madison, Parties,
NAT'L GAZETTE, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 28, at
197-98.
90. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to assess the degree to which the Fram-
ers thought that virtue could play a role in government. Madison does speak at
times as if there were a public interest that comprised more than the aggregate of
individual interests. For Madison, however, the calculation of the course of men's
interests was fundamental in shaping all aspects of his defense of the constitutional
design, from the reliance on large republics to the separation of powers. See infra
notes 91-92 and accompanying text. Other Federalists openly scoffed at the ability of
virtue to play a role in the science of government. See Noah Webster, A Citizen of
America (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
38, at 129, 158 ("Virtue, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never will be,
till mens' [sic] natures are changed, a fixed, permanent principle and support of
government . . . ."); see also Americanus [John Stevens, Jr.], Letter to the New York
Daily Advertiser (Dec. 12, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 38, at 487. Stevens wrote:
Can any man, who has a tolerable acquaintance of human nature, imag-
ine that men would so eagerly engage in public affairs, from whence they
can hope to derive no personal emolument, merely from the impulse of so
exalted, so pure, so disinterested a passion as patriotism, or political
virtue? No! it is ambition that constitutes the very life and soul of Re-
publican Government. As fear and attachment insure obedience to Gov-
ernment so does ambition set its wheels in motion.
Id. at 490.
Even if some kind of public virtue had a role to play, such virtue may well
have been conceived largely as a respect for others' exercise of natural rights. The
point here, however, is not to resolve the nature and scope of virtue in its relation
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Thus, the Constitution's pluralist mechanisms can be under-
stood as the working out of old world republican theory in a new
world. Because the new world was possessed of a greater diffu-
sion and a greater variety of interests than the old world, mech-
anisms for assuring stability had to address this diffusion and
variety. Thus, the first mechanism of pluralism was the creation
of a large republic that helped assure against the entrenched
control of any single interest. The larger republic would in fact
contain a sufficient number of factions so that shifting coalitions
of diffuse interests would struggle for control, thus ventilating
conflict." Pluralism thus recaptures in a more fluid social order
the catharsis that old world republicanism created by facilitating
the conflict among the democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical
elements in society.
A second mechanism for republican catharsis was the encour-
agement of conflict through the separation of powers and feder-
alism. The separation of powers, of course, facilitates conflict by
pitting ambition against ambition. Moreover, the tension be-
tween the state and federal government, with their distinct but
overlapping responsibilities, also helps to ensure that no faction
will entirely control the instruments of governmental power."
The social release provided by internal conflict of distinct social
elements in the Machiavellian republic gave way in a less rigidly
stratified society to political clashes between different avatars of
to government in the minds of the Framers, but simply to show that the republican
theory that was part of the common grammar at the time of the Framing put man's
self-interest at the center of the science of government, and thus naturally led to
pluralism.
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 25, at 82-84.
92. This aspect of the separation of powers theory is manifest in THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition."). The same kind of approach also animates the dis-
cussion of federalism. Indeed, Hamilton's approach to federalism is of a piece with
his psychology of the ruling class-a psychology that owes much to Machiavelli's
dynamic republicanism. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that he views federalism as another mechanism to harness these
passions in the service of the republic. For Hamilton, both federal and state govern-
ments will be "depositories" of the "strength of the community" and the struggles
that can be expected will bear similarities to those of the aristocracy against the
national monarch. See THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120-22 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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a single body politic." Republican theory thus naturally led to
the Constitution's establishment of government as a mobile
whose intricate motions perpetually attempt to displace factions
as quickly as they are propelled into power by the political life of
the nation.
The structures of separation of powers and federalism that
this republican-pluralist understanding placed at the heart of
the Constitution are notable problems for Sunstein's deliberative
regime of social transformation. In creating a separation of pow-
ers system in which the legislature, executive, and judiciary
were all conceived of as having conflicting institutional ambi-
tions, the Framers consciously made government less efficient in
order to protect liberties. State governments retained govern-
mental powers in part so that their exercise of these powers
would serve as a counterweight even when the federal govern-
ment was united. 4 These structures make sense if the purpose
of government is essentially to perfect the enforcement of natu-
ral rights that sustain a civil society. The social blueprint has
already been laid down and government is simply to be engaged
in the details-important details to be sure-of construction. As
Sunstein himself makes clear, however, these structures make
substantially less sense if government is responsible for con-
structing society from scratch, because the branches have been
designed to quarrel over the social initiatives. According to
Sunstein, the New Deal "carr[ied] forward and deepen[ed] the
original commitment to deliberative democracy."95 Yet, a para-
graph later, Sunstein admits that in deepening this commitment
the New Deal substantially revised federalism and the separa-
tion of powers." Local self-governance under federalism "often
served as an obstacle to necessary social change; too often it was
93. If institutions such as state and federal government are more liable to control
by different factions, conflict between the institutions will tend to ensure the politi-
cal participation of the different factions in the political life of the republic. I explore
this thesis in my forthcoming article, Toward a Strict Doctrine of Preemption and a
Machiavellian Constitution (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 92, at 120-22.




vulnerable to powerful private groups."" Separation of powers
as originally conceived was also suspect, because "[aiggressive
government initiatives could not easily be generated within a
system in which the different branches of government worked
against one another."" It is surprising that Sunstein did not
consider whether a view of the Constitution that required the
total restructuring of the cornerstones of separation of powers
and federalism actually reflected the document's foundational
commitments.
It also follows from republican theory that the government
cannot protect all rights perfectly and directly because a regime
of sufficient unity and power to accomplish this objective would
ultimately threaten natural rights because of its potential for
tyranny and instability. This realism was also reinforced by the
predominant religious sensibility at the time of the Founding.99
Even though security of rights is the objective of government, in
a fallen world perfection in security is not possible: "If men were
angels, no government would be necessary."0 0 Thus, although
the rights given by the Constitution and written law generally
reflect natural rights, they do not exactly embody them, because
it was understood that to be enforced under political government
the guarantees of liberty had to be clear, and, thus, more nar-
rowly defined.'' Government was a blunt instrument: even as
it secured rights it made them somewhat less full and re-
fined. 2
Moreover, republican realism also suggests why the Constitu-
tion relies largely on indirect methods of securing rights, such as
97. Id.
98. Id. at 61.
99. The Framers' religious understanding of the fallen nature of man, as well as
their republicanism, made them more pessimistic about what was achievable under
social contract theory than are contemporary social contract theorists, such as Rich-
ard Epstein or Robert Nozick, who seem to believe in the possibility of perfecting
the security for rights. For reference to the influence of Calvinism on the Framing,
see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 3 (1951).
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 92, at 322.
101. This aspect of social theory at the time of the founding is well described in
Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
YALE L.J. 907, 937-44 (1993).
102. Id.
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that provided by placing responsibility for certain matters close-
ly related to property, in larger but nevertheless representative
government.' Schooled in the republican tradition, the Fram-
ers could readily understand that too great a reliance on direct
judicial enforcement of natural rights rather than indirect but
representative enforcement would give rise to a cycle of tyranny
and instability, ultimately rendering government a less, not
more, effective guarantor of rights. 0 "
This account of the relation between republicanism, pluralism,
and natural rights does a far better job than Sunstein's theory of
republicanism in explaining the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. It is also fatal to Sunstein's attempt to suggest that a
103. For instance, the federal government is given the authority to regulate com-
merce, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and mint money, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
These matters are placed in control of a representative government at the federal
level, not because deliberation at the federal level is inherently desirable or a good
in itself, but because matters affecting commercial activity are best regulated in a
large representative republic, which is less subject to the tyranny of particular fac-
tions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 25, at 83.
Other provisions of the Constitution also reflect the understanding that rights
may be best guaranteed indirectly through representative government acting through
positive law. For instance, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 1, addresses the problem of providing for the rights of out-of-state citi-
zens who were at particular risk of being deprived of their rights when in another
state where they were not represented in the legislature. Privileges and immunities
are protected because they reflect, however imperfectly, natural rights, see Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), but the way the Con-
stitution protects against the serious risk that out-of-state citizens may be denied
natural rights is indirect: states are required to give the same bundle of rights to
out-of-state citizens as to their own citizens who are represented in government.
John Harrison recently has demonstrated that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileg-
es or Immunities Clause similarly protects against the danger that states would
deny natural rights to minorities. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the civil
rights that a state gives to its majority citizens through its positive law be also
extended to its minority citizens. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
104. Thus, under this view, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was decided
properly because it was the task of Congress rather than the judiciary to protect
property rights other than vested rights protected by the Contract Clause and the
Fifth Amendment.
In any event, the relation between pluralism, natural rights, and republicanism
outlined here is in tension with the notion that the Constitution incorporates as a
matter of law the straightforward enforcement of all or even most natural rights.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DoMAiN (1985) (arguing for substantial judicial enforcement of natural rights).
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deliberative democracy empowered to transform civil society is
consistent with, let alone captures the essence of, the political
philosophy behind the founding of the republic. The Constitution
was constructed on the understanding that rights were emphati-
cally natural. These rights, modeled on the paradigm of property
rights, were entirely negative liberties; they gave no one a claim
on the resources of others. Most fundamentally, they were the
presuppositions of government rather than mere objects of its
deliberation.
II. THE NATURAL DEFECTS OF SUNSTEIN'S CONSTITUTION
The political philosophy behind Sunstein's constitution differs
from the Framers' Constitution in two essential respects. First,
as discussed above, Sunstein's interpretation rejects a natural
rights baseline; second, whereas the Framers relied essentially
on private and institutional interest as a constraint on govern-
ment, Sunstein places confidence in the ability of deliberative
reasoning to restrain government.
This Section will suggest that both aspects of Sunstein's con-
stitution would have unfortunate consequences. The abandon-
ment of the natural rights baseline of the Constitution trans-
forms the Constitution from a document that preserves an order
immanent in civil society to one that authorizes its constant dis-
ruption by government. Its reliance on reason as the principal
constraint on government risks tyranny because reason is al-
most infinitely manipulable in the political world.
These consequences are manifest in the context of the First
Amendment-a jurisprudence that Sunstein seeks to revise
ostensibly to encourage the dispersion of public policy informa-
tion and thus facilitate the process of reasoning in a deliberative
democracy. Vitiating the state action doctrine, he permits intru-
sive government regulation of information production by private
actors. Moreover, Sunstein's own discussion of the public policy
information consumed in a democracy inadvertently reveals the
inherent weakness of reason as a constraint on government:
citizens by and large simply lack incentives to acquire much of
the information necessary for reasoned collective decisionmak-
ing. Nothing in Sunstein's First Amendment reforms will change
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this basic fact, because this weakness inheres in the nature of
man and collective decisionmaking.
A. Sunstein's First Amendment as a Matrix for Government
Regulation
The consequences of Sunstein's rejection of the natural rights
baseline of the Constitution is nowhere more dramatic than in
his dissolution of the state action doctrine." 5 The natural
rights baseline provides a clear standard for determining state
action: the State's enforcement of a contract is not state action
because the State is perfecting a natural right. On the other
hand, the State's enactment of legislation that regulates a
citizen's ability to contract is state action because it is interfer-
ing with a natural right. Only the latter kind of government
action needs to be restrained by the Constitution, because they
potentially interfere with natural rights. Sunstein, however, sees
no essential difference between the State's enforcing natural
rights and interfering with them: both enforcement and interfer-
ence can equally be understood as state action. °6 He thus be-
lieves that the state action doctrine has in the past reflected
what he views as "status quo neutrality"--the wrong-headed
notion that some practices are rooted in the exercise of
prepolitical rights and beyond the reach of the deliberative re-
gime of social transformation envisaged by the Constitution.0 7
Accordingly, for Sunstein, the question of state action ultimately
is inseparable from the issue of the merits of the constitutional
question at issue because a private actor's deployment of proper-
ty on any substantial scale depends on the protections of the
State and thus may be ultimately attributed to the State. 108
Although Sunstein certainly suggests that some private action
should be beyond the reach of constitutional scrutiny,0 9 the
105. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 71-75.
106. Id. at 74.
107. Id. at 72.
108. Sunstein suggests at one point that he does not "argue that the state action
requirement should be abandoned" but a few sentences later says that any issue of
state action should be resolved on the "merits" and "constitutional principles." Id. at
75. He thus fails to understand the state action doctrine as an independent limita-
tion on the ability of the government to disturb private ordering.
109. Id. at 72. He conspicuously fails to offer a test for deciding what constitutes
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scope of private action immune from constitutional attack will
be decided on a case-by-case basis without any cross-cutting
barrier such as that represented by a state action doctrine em-
bedded in the Constitution's natural rights baseline.
Sunstein's rejection of state action as an independent limita-
tion on the Constitution's scope represents a huge transfer of
power from individuals to the State: the doctrine assures that
provisions such as the Bill of Rights remain what they were in-
tended to be-a restraint on governmental interference with
liberties rooted in natural rights. In the absence of a clear dis-
tinction between governmental and private action, such prohibi-
tions become unmoored and in fact, as we shall see, may actual-
ly be converted into justifications for interfering with such lib-
erties.
Sunstein's First Amendment jurisprudence is a prime example
of the manner in which his dissolution of the state action doc-
trine would radically change the operation of the polity."' For
instance, Sunstein argues that because the government gives
broadcasters the right to air material by license, their decisions
to exclude material offensive to a potential class of viewers may
violate the First Amendment."' Thus, in Sunstein's view, the
First Amendment may actually mandate government interven-
tion to assure that broadcasters provide diverse material."'
Sunstein also seems to suggest that the attempt of a newspaper
to exclude certain points of view from its pages may also be
regulated under the First Amendment.' Certainly, Sunstein's
understanding that all rights are created by the State makes it
easy to extend constitutional scrutiny from licensed broadcasters
to the unlicensed print media."' While broadcasters are depen-
state action and what does not.
110. He entitles his chapter on the First Amendment "Speech in the Welfare State:
A New Deal for Speech,' thus implying that his reforms will redistribute speech
rights in the manner the New Deal redistributed material property rights. See id. at
197.
111. Id. at 214, 222-23.
112. Id. at 210-11.
113. Id. at 212. In his recent book, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech,
Sunstein has suggested that some regulations (for instance, a right of reply regime)
can be applied to newspapers. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH 113 (1993).
114. For a discussion of Sunstein's views on this point, see supra notes 70-75 and
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dent on licenses, newspapers are also dependent on a whole
nexus of state-enforced laws: if a newspaper publishes an article
that it wants to publish rather than my article, it can do so
because it owns the processes necessary to publish it and the
State prevents me from appropriating these processes by laws
prohibiting conversion and trespass." 5 Viewing the editorial
decisions of broadcasters or newspapers as state action, howev-
er, means they become subject to public oversight. In Sunstein's
hands, the First Amendment, which is a charter for liberty from
government, becomes a matrix for government regulation.
The notion that the First Amendment permits or indeed man-
dates the government to be a roving commission to regulate
speech in order to promote speech has something of an Orwell-
ian ring to it. Sunstein avoids confronting the danger that this
view would lead to the pervasive regulation of speech only by
failing to follow the logic of his own argument. For instance,
Sunstein suggests that a private college's decision to expel stu-
dents for racist speech would be its own and not subject to con-
stitutional scrutiny."6 Despite his acknowledgment that tres-
pass law, which would be used to enforce the expulsion, repre-
sents state action under his constitution, he contends that its
operation is content-neutral (because it can be invoked equally
to enforce the expulsion of students for other reasons) and thus
would not be subject to searching First Amendment scrutiny."7
Sunstein's attempt to tame the wild consequences of his dilution
of the state action doctrine in the First Amendment context,
however, is inconsistent with the premises of that rejection.
accompanying text.
115. In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme Court
justified more intrusive regulation of the broadcast medium than of newspapers, but
that decision rested on the scarcity in the broadcasting spectrum. Sunstein, however,
does not simply rely on the scarcity rationale, because that rationale is no longer
factually viable. See President Reagan's Veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of
1987, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 715 (1987) (noting the erosion of the factual
underpinnings of the Red Lion decision). With the rise of cable television, an enor-
mous number of programming outlets have been made available. Indeed, there are
more cable channels available in most cities than there are newspapers.




On Sunstein's own logic, the decision to expel students be-
cause of their speech also must be evaluated under the First
Amendment. The private college's decisionmaking process rests
on state laws that establish the university as a corporation as
well as other laws that protect the physical safety of the persons
engaged in and the premises used in the decisionmaking. With-
out a clear distinction between state action and private action,
the decision to expel the students for racist speech may thus
also be attributed to the State. Sunstein might argue that those
laws authorizing and protecting the university are content-neu-
tral in the sense that they also would authorize or protect deci-
sions to expel students for other kinds of speech, but such an
appeal to the generality of the authorization or protection pro-
vided by these laws is unavailing without a clear distinction be-
tween private and public action. Certainly the Supreme Court
would not be deterred from applying strict scrutiny to a public
university's decision to expel students for racist speech, even if
the university were also authorized to expel students for ex-
pressing religious views."'
In any event, Sunstein's assertion of the content neutrality of
trespass laws does not much reduce the dangers his First
Amendment regime poses for previously unregulated discourse,
because even content-neutral governmental behavior is substan-
tially regulated by the First Amendment. For instance, content-
neutral rules are still subject to some kind of balancing tests:
"regulatory choices aimed at harms not caused by ideas or infor-
mation as such are acceptable so long as they do not unduly con-
strict the flow of information and ideas.""' Indeed, just a few
pages after Sunstein's celebration of the content neutrality of
trespass laws, he suggests that the Court nevertheless should
consider whether the First Amendment requires a shopping
center to suspend its use of such laws to evict protesters, be-
cause there may have been no other effective outlet for pro-
test. '2 Thus, even on Sunstein's own terms, his Constitution
118. See R.A.v. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (discussing the constitu-
tionality of content-based restrictions).
119. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 791 (1988) (footnote omit-
ted).
120. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 208.
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gives the government enormously greater scope to regulate the
speech and association of citizens-sometimes even in the name
of the First Amendment.
B. Civic Republicanism and Civic Ignorance
A republic restrained by reason requires wide dispersion of
public policy information and the avowed purpose of Sunstein's
restructuring of First Amendment law is to produce information
conducive to democratic deliberation.12' Sunstein's First
Amendment discussion, however, signally undermines the allure
of civic republicanism, because it begins by unleashing govern-
ment on a most basic constitutional freedom ostensibly to pro-
mote the power of reason but ends by showing why reason is
inevitably a relatively powerless restraint on government. Unfor-
tunately, not only would many of his reforms frustrate rather
than facilitate the dispersion of information, but an analysis of
the real dilemmas inherent in the dispersion of public policy
information shows that collective decisionmaking has natural
defects that no restructuring of the First Amendment can cor-
rect.
Consider Sunstein's concerns about television news that in
some measure motivate his interest in regulating that medium.
As evidence that the television networks are not producing suffi-
cient deliberative information, Sunstein notes that the television
networks are giving presidential candidates on average less air
time to present their views on public issues, the average sound
bite having fallen from 42.3 seconds in 1968 to 9.8 seconds in
1988.122 He believes that competitive commercial pressures
among the networks are largely responsible for this reduc-
tion." The reasons for this reduction, however, are far more
complex. Other televised media have arisen to compete with the
networks and some, such as CNN and C-Span, have the capacity
to carry events live." This leads the networks to respond by
121. Id. at 198.
122. Id. at 216.
123. Id.
124. For a discussion of how the networks have lost their monopoly in delivering
the news, see TOM ROSENSTIEL, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: How TELEVISION AND THE
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providing new information in the form of analysis to the
candidate's presentation, thus adding to the information avail-
able. Second, the substitution of analysis for presentation can be
readily understood as a substantive viewpoint choice of the net-
works premised on the notion that politicians are at least in
some measure rational vote seekers more interested in winning
than in promoting any particular public position.1" Thus, ana-
lyzing the possibly strategic reasons behind a politician's adop-
tion of a public policy issue adds distinctive information for a
viewer, providing him with, among other things, a basis to dis-
count in some measure the likelihood the politician will pursue
the policy once in office should the political landscape shift.'26
Moreover, the network news is not the only potential forum for
candidates' presentations: the 1992 campaign demonstrated that
when the necessity for the candidates to reach the people direct-
ly in greater numbers than generally watch CNN and C-Span
arose, the candidates were able to take advantage of talk shows
to get their messages across. 7 In response to changes in tech-
nology the market is giving more information about the candi-
dates rather than less.
This more complex understanding of the networks' behavior
and politicians' reaction to it illustrates the danger of govern-
ment regulation that would try to modify it. Regulation of the
proportion of time devoted to candidates' presentations on net-
works likely would retard the process of information producing
change, because networks would be discouraged from offering
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES CHANGED AMERICAN POLITICS 64 (1992) (describing the
rising influence of the popular culture media on the 1992 campaign).
125. The networks are now beginning to reflect the new model of political behavior
constructed by public choice theorists. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 19, 23-24 (1991) (discussing the
public choice model of politicians). If academic theories have explanatory power, it is
not surprising that they will over time be diffused into the popular culture.
126. Similarly, the emphasis on the horse race aspect of campaigns which Sunstein
appears to deplore, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 216, has a relevance beyond
satisfying the public's curiosity, insofar as candidates' positions and tactics are
shaped by their standing in the polls.
127. See ROSENSTIEL, supra note 124, at 143, 170, 260. Using forums devoted to
entertainment to present the candidates has the advantage of drawing in those view-
ers who rationally choose to consume entertainment rather than public policy infor-
mation. See infra note 140.
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their commentary and candidates from seeking other outlets. It
is surprising that in an age where the medium is recognized as
at least part of the message,"' Sunstein also fails to under-
stand that a network's decision to reduce the politician's presen-
tation time as opposed to analysis conveys a viewpoint about
politics. Sunstein probably disagrees with such a jaundiced view
of politicians and their motives (how can men or women on the
make be expected to sustain a republic of reasons?), but that
should make us all the more suspicious about his complaints
about the content of television news.
Sunstein acknowledges that his concern about the broadcast-
ing market may seem a little bizarre in light of the "quality and
diversity" of views available from the many broadcast outlets
accessible besides the networks such as CNN and C-Span, but
responds by contending that because information has many of
the characteristics of a public good, too little will be produced
without government regulation."' Hi's justification for regulat-
ing the media in order to produce more plentiful and more di-
verse public policy information, even in the face of its apparent
abundance, is deeply inadequate. First, it is doubtful that in a
modern welfare state, where the State redistributes rents and
where politicians wield enormous power over citizens' lives, that
there are insufficient incentives to make any public policy argu-
ment that would advance the possibility of taking power.'13 On
the other hand, if the information that the market fails to pro-
duce is defined not merely as information about public policy,
but as information about public policy that citizens need, there
will be intractable problems in determining what information is
128. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7
(1964).
129. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 219. As I point out below, this response is some-
thing of a non sequitur. The real problem is not production of information but con-
sumption: citizens make a rational choice to decline to consider the ample informa-
tion that is produced. See infra text accompanying note 139.
130. See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 1, 22 (1986) (suggesting that public policy information will be produced
as an instrument of gaining power). Thus, we should expect that much public policy
information will be produced in the same ample amounts as advertising. Indeed, this
conclusion is consistent with Sunstein's own observation about the quality and diver-
sity of views. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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necessary for the citizen. Even where consumer and market
goods are at issue, a regulator must struggle to determine the
information for which the rational consumer would be willing to
pay, assuming a perfect market in information.'' If the prod-
uct at issue is a health plan for the entire nation rather than a
light bulb, how even unbiased regulators would create a more
perfect market is entirely unclear; they would have no principled
basis to decide what information citizens need. 32  Thus,
Sunstein in his emphasis on the "market" failure problem of
producing public policy information unwittingly underscores yet
another important disadvantage of collective decisionmaking
compared to the decentralized decisionmaking of the mar-
kets.133
Even in the absence of the conceptual difficulties with a regu-
latory regime designed to increase the diversity and quality of
views, any real republican understands the central problem of
implementing the idea in a political world: the rulers have a
natural interest in suppressing and manipulating speech to their
own advantage.14 That Sunstein's proposed regimes are pur-
portedly designed to increase diversity is no answer. A message
can be weakened by being forced to appear with other messages
on the topic; a right of reply can deter some messages from be-
ing disseminated at all by raising the costs of producing the
original message. Indeed, any diversity regime inevitably entan-
131. For a discussion of the argument that regulation can induce a better market
in information for simple goods, see Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Pro-
tection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 665 (1977).
132. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLU . L. REV. 334, 370 (1991) (doubting that it is possible to know what political
information a citizen would want made available without knowing his preferences).
133. I am indebted to Stewart Stork and Paul Shupack for discussion of this point.
Other principal problems of collective decisionmaking, already well outlined in the
public choice literature, are (1) strategic behavior by which citizens rationally fail to
state their true preferences, creating barriers to allocative efficiency, and (2) rent
seeking in which various factions of citizens rationally use the government to expro-
priate others' wealth, creating productive inefficiencies. See MUELLER, supra note 18,
at 37-43, 229-47.
134. Professor Farber, who appears to agree with Sunstein that public policy infor-
mation has many of the characteristics of a public good, stresses that for that very
reason rulers may face little resistance in suppressing public policy information. See
Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amend-
ment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 564 (1991).
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gles the government in making decisions about the content of
what will be broadcast."5 For instance, to determine whether a
view has been insufficiently represented, the State will have to
make fine distinctions. Does the view of a traditional conserva-
tive require the response of a libertarian as well as a liberal?
What about a socialist? Other views will raise questions of
whether they are within the compass of the politically thinkable.
Does Sunstein believe that analysts who advocate summary
punishment as the answer to urban crime and disorder should
get time equal to those who propose more traditional solu-
tions?.. If the State chooses limited diversity it will become
the arbiter of the mainstream; if it prefers unlimited diversity,
the State will subsidize and celebrate every lunatic and extrem-
ist with a distinctive politic.
Thus, aside from the problems of subtle and not so subtle
censorship inherent in the reform proposals Sunstein would
have us consider,'37 little imagination is needed to understand
that a regime required to determine the kind of views to be
broadcast may lead to social instability as well, as taboos are ei-
ther reinforced or broken by an official, central decisionmaker.
Another of the advantages of freedom of speech in the Framer's
Constitution is that, like other property rights, it facilitates
social stability through the dispersion of power. The First
Amendment permits the social consensus necessary to any soci-
135. The push for "diversity" in the academic world has operated as "at least in
part a cover for a political power grab by the left." Steven C. Bahs, Political Cor-
rectness and the American Law School, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1041, 1055 n.59 (1991)
(quoting Professor Alan Dershowitz). Professor Dershowitz is also quoted as asking:
"How many politically correct students are demanding in the name of diversity an
increase in the number of evangelical Christians, National Rifle Association members
and Right to Life advocates?" Id. Given that those on the left are predominant in
law schools, see infra note 153 and accompanying text, this is an instructive example
of the way a diversity regime will be manipulated by those who have control of bu-
reaucratic power.
136. Such an advocate might be a latter day disciple of Joseph De Maistre who
saw the executioner as central to social order. See Joseph De Maistre, IV OEUVRES
COMPLETES DE J. DE MAiSTRE 33 ("Et cependant toute grandeur, toute puissance,
toute repose sur l'ex6cuteur: il est lhorreur et le lien de l'association humaine. Otez
du monde cet agent incomprehensible; dans l'instant m6me l'ordre fait place au cha-
os, les tr6nes s'abitment et la soci~t disparalt.")
137. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 222 (listing possible First Amendment reforms).
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ety (but particularly a democracy) to be arrived at organically
through the decisions of hundreds of mediating institutions such
as press and universities and therefore to evolve slowly to con-
form to additions in knowledge and changes in sentiment, thus
minimizing social disturbance. One of the many defects of a
scheme of government enforced diversity is that government
would set the contours of the consensus, resulting in a more
brittle framework less amenable to steady transformation and
more susceptible to violent dissolutions and reconstitutions of
the social fabric of shared ideas.'38
Finally, and most troubling of all, Sunstein's own discussion of
the First Amendment reveals a natural defect of civic repub-
licanism: it is the nature of man and not some correctable fail-
ure in the market for public policy information that inhibits
reasoned collective decisionmaking among citizens of the repub-
lic. Although Sunstein is concerned that citizens do not obtain
sufficient public policy information, C-Span already provides a
very wide range of views (including the debates in the House
and the Senate and discussions spanning the spectrum of public
policy institutes from the Cato Institute to the Institute for Poli-
cy Studies) in amounts that would permit the concerned citizen
to spend his entire day consuming public policy information. Of
course, a relatively small percentage of the millions who have
access to these programs watch, but this shows that the basic
problem is consumption, not production: few citizens use the
vast amount of information that is already available at low or no
monetary cost to them. Citizens have projects other than demo-
cratic deliberation and, given the choice, few spend a large
amount of time considering social policy."3 9 Sunstein never
gives any evidence that citizens have ever behaved differently,
at least in a nontotalitarian society.
138. The advantages of informal consensus to social stability is one of the many
answers to Sunstein's rhetorical question: Why should the Constitution bar a
"Madisonian experiment" to obtain a greater quality and diversity of views? See id.
at 220.
139. See Daniel E. Troy, Talking Points, 97 COMMENTARY 63, 64 (1994) (reviewing
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)) ("PBS,
let alone the various public-affairs cable channels, are already ignored by millions.").
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Indded, a citizen's decision to limit his intake of public policy
information is a completely rational choice for two separate but
reinforcing reasons. First, in collective decisionmaking it is very
unlikely that any decision of an individual citizen made on the
basis of such information will make a difference to the outcome
of a decision that depends on the views of thousands or millions
of others. 4 ° Second, at least in a nontotalitarian society, a
citizen's private choices will affect the course of his life far more
than collective decisions and he therefore rationally will spend
far more time attempting to refine his private choices.'
Moreover, even apart from citizens' rational ignorance, many
citizens can be expected to suffer from cognitive ignorance of
many issues of public policy.' First, for reasons discussed
above, they lack incentives to train themselves to understand
information involved in complex public policy debates. Second,
some may lack the intellectual ability to understand all the
intricacies of such debates thus empowering demagogues and
140. Indeed, while Sunstein objects to the information-to-entertainment ratio of
much local news, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 215-16, a regime with this ratio
may impart information to more citizens than would a regime that produced only
pure public policy information, because it recognizes that most people follow news
for its entertainment value. See POSNER, supra note 130, at 23 (suggesting that
television news is packaged as entertainment rather than information because the
public attaches little value to political information). The real way Sunstein could get
more exposure for public policy information is to abolish professional sports, drama,
cinema, and music, because then citizens would have fewer alternatives to listening
to politicians, public policy analysts, and law professors.
141. In a society with an all-powerful government, it might be more rational for a
citizen to devote a greater expenditure of time to public policy debates, not in the
interest of influencing them, but in the interest of predicting their outcome and
changing his position or behavior to temper their potentially devastating effect on
his well being. For instance, citizens in Maoist China were well advised to follow
the latest thoughts of Chairman Mao. Thus, to be fair, if Sunstein were successful
in creating a government with a vast scope for social transformation, he might suc-
ceed in getting citizens to pay more attention.
142. This assumes that public policy discourse has at least some factual or deduc-
tive element as well as an emotional or ideological component. For instance, it as-
sumes that the effects of the minimum wage on unemployment figures are relevant
to a public policy debate about the wisdom of the minimum wage. This assumption
seems to be descriptively true of contemporary public policy debates: while it would
be, of course, logically possible to favor a certain level for the minimum wage, re-
gardless of the number who were unemployed by its implementation, very few, if
any, policy makers publicly take that position.
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dissemblers who will arise to exploit this ignorance.'
Sunstein, like most civic republicans, never even addresses the
issue of the natural limits to republican discourse in a large
republic with a universal franchise.
III. REASONS AND INTERESTS IN SUNSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY
Thus, Sunstein's own discussion of information dispersion
should make us doubt his central claim that "[there is all the
difference in the world between a system in which representa-
tives try to offer some justification for their decisions, and a
system in which political power is the only thing that is at
work."' Given the nature of man and the nature of collective
decisionmaking, few citizens will listen to much public reasoning
and even fewer will fully understand all of it. Indeed, Sunstein's
general silence concerning the capacity of reasoned argument to
make such an enormous difference is the most surprising aspect
of a jurisprudence that celebrates the place of reason in a repub-
lic. This is a serious defect, not only because of the natural con-
straints on collective decisionmaking discussed above, but be-
cause of common sense observation of the political scene. Mem-
bers of the House and Senate always provide reasons for their
actions on the floor and in press releases, and yet social scien-
143. The distribution of cognitive abilities will constrain collective decisionmaking
taken on the basis of complex public policy arguments. Psychologists estimate that
professionals, such as physicians or engineers, must possess a minimum I.Q. of 114
in order to be successful, thus the professions are accessible to only about 13% or
14% of the population. See DANIEL SELIGMAN, A QUESTION OF INTELLIGENCE 143
(1992); see also Intelligence Among University Scientists, NATURE, Feb. 4, 1967, at
441 (suggesting the existence of a threshold of intelligence necessary to be a scien-
tist; an I.Q. of 112 appeared to be the threshold for social scientists). If we assume
that most serious public policy arguments are as complex as the arguments evaluat-
ed in professional schools, some citizens may have trouble digesting some aspects of
these arguments.
Thus, collective decisionmaking on many matters, far from being a vehicle in
which all citizens can equally realize themselves, actually turns out to be a stratified
caste system in which some citizens may participate substantially less than others.
One of the advantages of a system of decentralized decisionmaking, such as the
market, over collective decisioumaking, is that it evolves social arrangements that
provide each citizen with decisionmaking authority over matters that he is well
equipped to address.
144. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 28.
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tists nevertheless interpret their actions as exercises of pure po-
litical power which will aid them or their constituents.'45 In-
deed, it is particularly difficult to distinguish sharply between
acts based on reason and those rooted in naked preferences, if
one believes, as Sunstein apparently does, that helping a par-
ticular class of society may offer sufficient reason to justify legis-
lation."' In the welfare state, reasons and preferences turn out
to be strikingly coterminous. A Senator from a Western state
defending below market grazing fees for his constituents may
offer the reason that his constituents otherwise would not get
their fair share from the welfare state as well as suggest that
such subsidies preserve a way of life important to the national
heritage." 7 Yet his ability to offer these reasons hardly would
seem to suggest that raw political power was not at work."
The difficulties in distinguishing reason from preference are
not merely observational but also philosophical. Sunstein is un-
clear when he suggests that reasons make a world of difference.
Does the fact that a man is offering reasons mean that he is not
also acting out of interests? Since the Enlightenment, man has
been an object of scientific explanation and the reasons he gives
are also subject to analyses and dissection. Hume, for instance,
explains mankind's reason in terms of his passions. 49 His nat-
ural successors are sociobiologists, economists and public choice
political scientists who explain human behavior in terms of
145. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) (pro-
posing a behavioral model for government based upon rational political behavior).
146. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 34-35.
147. See 137 CONG. REC. S13,122 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (remarks of Sen. Garn)
(asserting that higher grazing fees "are, in effect, an extermination order on our
rural way of life"); 137 CONG. REC. H5700 (daily ed. July 23, 1991) (remarks of Rep.
Marlenne) (observing that representatives from Oklahoma who suggest higher graz-
ing fees are "playing in some very dangerous minefields" in light of subsidies for
Oklahoma winter wheat).
148. Of course, to a pluralist this is not disturbing because the justice of a system
is not measured by its ability to generate reasons for governmental action. Indeed, if
reason were the principal measure of justice many communist systems would rate
highly, because such governments employed ideologies for the purpose of comprehen-
sively justifying all actions.
149. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS,
in ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS 169 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., 3d ed. 1975) (1877).
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interests and biological imperatives. Indeed, the best-known
alternative to the interest-based explanation of human behavior,
Kantian moral philosophy, would not seem to offer Sunstein
much solace because it understands reasons as providing a
knowledge different in kind from natural science. 5 ' If reason-
ing operates in a realm of knowledge wholly distinct from that of
empirical science, the reason-versus-preference distinction on
which Sunstein relies so heavily is vacuous as a criterion of
decision or restraint because every action can simultaneously be
understood under the category of reason as well as interest.
Sunstein simply may be arguing that requiring a public decla-
ration of reasons will fundamentally change the outputs of the
system for the better by changing the constraints under which
government actors act and thus the relevant constellation of
interests, but he never offers a defense of even this modest
claim. Strangely enough, he praises the legal realists who used
the intuitions of Marx and Freud to suggest that the normative
claims of property were rationalizations of interest, but he seems
to ignore them in his celebration of reason.' If the realists
were correct to believe that because of rationalization and self-
delusion reason was a weak or a nonexistent constraint on the
judicial process-a process that, by its norms and tradition, puts
reasoning at its core--can the requirement of deliberative ratio-
nality really substantially change the outputs of the political
process?.2
150. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 733 (1985)
(viewing Kant as rejecting the explanatory system of Hume in favor of prioristic
epistemologies on which knowledge can be constructed).
151. See LAURA KALIAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 164 (1986) (argu-
ing that Jerome Frank, the 'father of legal realism" explained judicial decisionmak-
ing in terms of Freudian categories); Steve Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck:
Scientific Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 549, 557-
58 n.19 (1988) (suggesting that legal realists used Marxist class analysis to show
that legal activity was not "governed by regularities that are relatively autonomous
from other aspects of social life").
152. It should be remembered that the legal process school, which was the most
important response to the legal realists, stressed legal concepts such as stare decisis
that provided the judicial process with a greater structure of deliberative rationality
than the legislative process. See John 0. McGinnis, The 1991 Supreme Court Term:
Review and Outlook, 1993 PUB. INTEREST REV. 165, 166-67 (arguing that the legal
process school views stare decisis as a "still point that distinguishes the deliberative
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Thus, at the center of Sunstein's philosophy of the republic of
reasons there is a void about the nature of reason. This is dis-
turbing in a regime where reason is to be the principal restraint,
because a republican naturally would believe that the rulers will
tend to manipulate a concept as amorphous as reason in their
own interest. Even well-intentioned rulers may rationalize as
founded in reason actions that are in their own interest. Indeed,
a republican naturally would be moved to consider whether,
despite Sunstein's own obvious good will, his own proposals for
social reform and indeed his whole constitutional philosophy can
be understood as an attempt to advance his own interests and
the interests of the class of which he is a member and which
determines his professional status-the academic class general-
ly, and more particularly, the class of liberal-left academics that
predominate in contemporary law schools. 5'
For instance, Sunstein's suggestion that government might
engage in more regulation to ensure a greater diversity of views
in the media would benefit this class, if their views would not be
as well represented in the broadcast media as they would be
under a regime of enforced diversity. There is substantial evi-
dence that the country has been moving to the right and com-
mentary on radio and television has moved to the right."4 Un-
rationality of courts from the turbulent movements of the political world").
153. One of the many measures of how far to the left legal academia has moved is
the huge disparity between those who opposed and those who supported the nom-
ination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. Of the remarkable 34.3% of all law
professors who expressed a view on the nomination, opponents outnumbered support-
ers approximately 18 to 1. See Roger B. Clegg & Mike DeBow, A Post Socialist
Reading List for Pre-Law Students, POLICY REV., Winter 1994, at 76. While Bork
lost by a margin of 58 to 42, the discrepancy between the percentage of Bork's sup-
porters in the Senate to the percentage of supporters among those who had declared
themselves in legal academia is still extraordinary: eight-to-one.
There is a substantial consensus among scholars of varying political views that
the legal academy leans decidedly to the left side of the American political spectrum.
See Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of America Led the People
to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 TEx. L. REv. 759, 771 (1991) (arguing that the
legal academy is to the left of the public); Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars and
the "Middle Ground," 91 MicH L. REv. 2075, 2107 (1993) (commenting that legal
academics are "mostly pretty liberal"); Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42
STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1381 (1990) (stating that "left-liberal academics" are predomi-
nant in American universities).
154. For discussion of the recent rise of conservative commentators in the mass
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der a diversity or right of reply regime, the class of liberal uni-
versity critics therefore might be expected to appear more often
than they do now.
Indeed, the skeptical republican might suspect that the rising
acceptance of government regulation of speech in the academic
community, which Sunstein reflects, is best explained by under-
standing how such regulation will further the political interests
that now dominate that community. 5' On this view, before the
1980's, both liberals and even those further to the left were gen-
erally united in favor of an absolutist approach to the First
Amendment,5 ' because the liberals and left believed in one
way or another that objective truth emerging from social science
was on their side and that so long as the government did not
prevent its dissemination, it would eventually substantially
advance the social transformation of society. A skeptical republi-
can might believe that their faith that objective truth was on
their side was shaken by the rise of disciplines more closely
allied to natural science, from sociobiology to law and economics,
which cast doubt on collectivist solutions generally, and specifi-
cally on the efficacy of government intervention to transform
adaptive social practices. 5 ' A logical consequence of this loss of
media, see Ed Bark, Commentators Twist the Dial to the Right, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 4, 1993, at 1C.
155. For another example of the left's dissatisfaction with current First Amendment
jurisprudence, see Morton J. Horowitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality with Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109-16 (1993) (describ-
ing the "Lochnerization" of the First Amendment).
156. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383 (explaining the happy marriage be-
tween the First Amendment and the left in previous decades).
157. In general, the rise of natural as opposed to environmental explanations for
social ordering currently poses the most substantial problem for liberal and left
social thought. For a general discussion of the revival of biologically based explana-
tions of human nature and society, see DEGLER, supra note 17, at 215-329. The
consequences for the political thought of nature's renewed rise in the social sciences
is a subject worthy of a separate essay. Here it is sufficient to note the problem
that nature's ascendancy may pose for some advocates of a politics of social transfor-
mation. Such a politics is often premised on the notion that through collective social
construction humankind can be changed from the being who has created the defec-
tive social order into a new man capable of achieving a social utopia or at least
sustaining progress toward it. Such advocates of social transformation thus contrast
humankind as constructed by progressive politics with the grasping and calculating
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faith would be a renewed interest in regulation of speech so as
to make certain that the thought of those on the left would con-
tinue to retain some share of the information market. Sunstein's
First Amendment proposals would preserve this share at the
level of public discourse, moving toward the cartelization we
already see in academic discourse, particularly with the rise of
new forms of narrative scholarship that self-consciously adopt
the view that, because they are based on a unique perspective,
they deserve a share of law review articles. 5 '
Looking beyond Sunstein's specific proposals, a skeptical re-
publican might view his entire approach as advancing the politi-
cal interest of the academic community of which he is part, be-
cause Sunstein packages ideas of important segments of that
community in a manner that will maximize their power in the
general body politic.'59 First, as discussed in Part I, Sunstein
argues that the Constitution from the time of the Framing em-
bodies a philosophy consistent with proposals for a greater role
for collective, as opposed to individual, decisionmaking. Al-
though most of his historical assertions are unsupportable, this
gives the social philosophy predominant in the legal academy a
patina of historical legitimacy that makes their proposals easier
for the general body politic to accept. Second, as discussed in
Part II, he incorporates familiar themes from radical scholarship
such as the rejection of the private-public distinction, 6 ' but
individual-homo economicus-at the root of the unjust social order. Evolutionary
biology, however, suggests that man's nature cannot be so easily altered by changing
the context from economics to politics. A human being remains the same homo sapi-
ens shaped by millions of years of evolution to be a competitor for status and re-
sources, regardless of whether the human is acting in the private or public sphere.
This raises questions about the prospects for fundamental social transformation
through politics.
158. See Richard A. Epstein, Legal Education and the Politics of Exclusion, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1607 (1993) (looking at the struggle between competition and protec-
tionism in the modern academic market).
159. My colleague Jeanne Schroeder has previously remarked upon Professor
Sunstein's interest in bringing radical theories into the mainstream by tempering
their radicalism. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Taming the Shrew: The Liberal Attempt to
Mainstream Radical Feminist Theory, 5 J.L. & FEMINISM 123, 124 (1992) (describing
how Sunstein brings Catherine MacKinnon's theories into the mainstream and dis-
torts them in the process).
160. The view espoused by critical legal studies is outlined in Symposium on the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
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masks their radical consequences by softening their hard edges
and refusing to follow them to their logical conclusion. Once
again, this serves the purpose of converting a jurisprudence of
the academic left that is irreconcilable in undiluted form with a
market oriented and pluralist society like our own into a politi-
cal program with greater possibility of influence. 6'
Revealing the interests behind normative claims of the rulers
or those who would be rulers is part of the historic enterprise of
republicanism. Indeed, Machiavelli's work can be understood as
an attempt to dispel the myths and mist of piety behind which
the medieval Church advanced its own interests at the expense
of the public: that is precisely why he was attacked as an
immoralist. 6' The social structures of the Middle Ages have
disappeared, but one can only expect that other institutions and
groups will attempt to occupy a similar niche of social power by
offering new myths, albeit in postmodern form. In this, if only in
this, I agree with Sunstein: a real republican's work is never
done.
161. This approach also has the advantage of pleasing more moderate liberals who
again have a program of meliorist social reform to embrace.
162. For a discussion of Machiavelli's attacks on Christianity, see MARK HULLING,
CITIZEN MACHIAVELLI 66-68 (1983).
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